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ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALL THE FACTS OF WHICH APPELLEES DID NOT TAKE ISSUE ARE
ADMITTED.
The Appellees did not take exception to the majority of the facts stated by
the Appellant in his Brief and therefore apparently agree with the statement of
those facts.
A.

Those facts to which the Appellees did not take exception:
In Appellant's Brief, Appellant set forth a detailed statement of facts

which was supported by specific references to the record. The Appellees
did not properly take exception to any of the statement of facts. Appellant

1

urges that the fair assessment of Appellees' statement of facts would
demonstrate that Appellees do not disagree with the majority of
Appellant's statement of facts. With few exceptions, which are treated
later in a subparagraph of this point, it could be said that Appellees not
only did not take exception to Appellant's statement of facts, but also
admitted the statements to be true when they make reference to the same
facts but attempt in their statement of facts to make arguments in
mitigation of those admitted facts.
The arguments which Appellees improperly make in their alleged
statement of facts in most instances do not mitigate against the facts as
they exist.
Aside from the problem that Appellees' statement of facts contain
inaccurate and non-relevant facts, Appellees simply do not refute the
facts with recitation made by Appellant in Appellant's statement of facts.
B.

Those facts to which Appellees apparently take exception:
Although Appellees do not directly attack the factual recitation

made by the Appellant, Appellees, by the nature of their statement of
facts, apparently claim that Appellant failed to marshal all of the evidence.

2

POINT II
APPELLEES FAIL TO PROVIDE ANY RELEVANT, CONFLICTING TESTIMONY
OR FAIL TO PROVIDE WHAT RELEVANT, CRUCIAL AND INCRIMINATING
EVIDENCE WAS WITHHELD.
A.

In Point I of Appellees' Brief, Appellees assert that Appellant failed

to marshal all of the evidence in support of his findings. Appellant challenged
paragraph 9 of the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in that Appellees "had
continuing expectations that Defendant [Appellant] would return to the leased
premises." However, Appellees fail establish what conflicting testimony or what
relevant, crucial, and incriminating evidence was withheld. There is simply no
evidence to support the trial court's finding that Appellees had a continuing
expectation that Appellant would return to the leased premises.
B.

In Point II of Appellees' Brief, Appellees assert that three (3) items

from Jones' testimony gave the trial court the basis for a finding that "Jones
[Appellee] always had the expectation that Arambel [Appellant] would return to
the leased premises . . . ." Items 2 and 3 deal with the contract for the purchase
of the cows, which contract was completed prior to the events effecting the
surrender and termination of the lease or the abandonment of the premises by
Appellant1. Item 1 was properly addressed in Appellant's statement of facts (See
paragraph 5 of Appellant's Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law).
1

Neither the trial court's concluding statements (T. 284, 285), Memorandum Decision,
Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law, nor the Judgment & Decree provide any mention
as to the contract for the purchase of the cows, such statements not being relevant to the
issues before the court and the lease agreement.
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C.

In Point III of Appellees' Brief Appellees agaii i fail to establish how

Appellant failed to marshal his evidence. Appellees claim there was a "course of
clealii igs betweei i lot les [Appellee] and Arambel [Appellant] foi the mutual use
of the facilities, equipment and tools . . . made it clear that the leased premises
were available to Arambel [Appellant] at all times2."
Contrary to this assertion, it is undisputed that:
1.

T h e Defendant/Appellant unequivocally surrendered the premises

to the Plaintiffs/Appellees as evidenced b> abai icioi 11 i ler it of tl le ( )i en lises
in September 1991 (T. 88); Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay rent in
July 1992 (1. 32 - 34, 104); r iotifie< I PI; lii itiffs/ Af >j »ei!ec is ii i a letti = n date* 1 •
October 8, 1992, of Defendant/Appellant's intent to abandon the premises
.'mil iPiriii!!,]ii!M'« (hi* lease a y i e e m e f i l ( I HO, >)|, Defendant's Exhibit # 2 1 ) .
2.

The Plaintiffs/Appellees exercised immediate and absolute

d o m i n i n n MI ir11:cnill nl ovoi the premises ( i

•- • •

—

i

1nQ

1nc

106, 140-146).
3.

Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after

Defendant/Appellant vacated tl ie premises, Plaii itiff/Appellee Noi * al
Jones placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards,

Neither the trial court's concluding comments, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact &
Conclusion of Law, nor the Judgment & Decree make any mention as to the past course of
dealings in support of alleged findings that Appellees had a reasonable expectation that
Appellant would return to the leased premises, or that the leased premises were available
to Appellant at al! times.
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placed hay into the shed, placed his own personal farm equipment into
the commodity sheds, and used the farm machinery, including the grain
chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader for his own
use and benefit (T. 38 -41, 97 -100).
4.

Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones sold the tenant house to Randy and

Karen Jones (T. 100 -102; 145, 146).
5.

From and after Defendant/Appellant's surrender of the possession

of the premises, Defendant/Appellant never attempted to retake
possession, dominion or control over the premises surrendered (T. 90,
91; Defendant's Exhibit #21).
6.

Plaintiffs/Appellees made no effort whatsoever to relet the

premises, and Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones acknowledged that he
made no effort to release the premises to anyone else, and that he didn't
want to release the premises to anyone else although he was contacted
by three (3) parties who were interested in leasing the premises
immediately after Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises (T. 101,
107-109).
7.

Plaintiffs/Appellees never introduced any evidence to demonstrate

an election of the remedy, but the evidence demonstrated that
Plaintiffs/Appellees' conduct, as a matter of law, constituted an election to
terminate the lease agreement.

5

I -

' - *'M

••

•:

i* tl ie facilities,

such does not translate into a reasonable expectation that the leased premises
were aiailph'" (<> 'Ippellanl ,il .ill i'in»»s

I he ubove-stated items clearly

establish, by Appellees' own actions, that they did not have a reasonable
expectation that Appellant would return to the leased premises.
POINT III
IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT APPELLEES FAILED TO MAKE REASONABLE
STEPS TO MITIGATE THEIR LOSSES, WHICH ORDINAP" Y MEANS A
LANDLORD MUST SEEK TO RELET THE PREMISES.
Appellees asset that the continuing "expectation that Arambel [Appellant]
\vot ltd i eti II i i to tf ie leased pi ei i lises was i easoi lable,' ai id, for tl' lat reason, failed
to relet the premises thereby mitigating their damages. Such notion flies in the
face of

11 Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896

(Utah 1989).
Appellees state four (4) items which would negate Appellees'
responsibility to seek to relet the premises after bread l of the lease agi eei T lei it.
However, items 2, 3, and 4 are not relevant and deal with the contract for
pi ir c I iase of the co\ \ s, i lot tl ie lease, wl iict t was con i ipleted pi i1 :»!" I: :> the events
effecting the surrender and termination, and before the abandonment of the
leased premises3. Item 1 deals vvitl i tl te i ei i io\ » al c f ! laylage in December 199?

3

The trial court did not mention the contract for purchase of the cows in its closing remarks
or Memorandum Decision, nor was this made a part of the Findings of Fact & Conclusions
of Law and Judgment & Decree.
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The trial court found that Appellees failed to take adequate steps to mitigate
damages after July 1, 1993 (1st Memorandum Decision). Appellant testified that
the haylage was removed in December 1991 (T. 279, 280).
A.

The overwhelming weight of the evidence provides that Appellees

did not have a reasonable expectation that Appellant would return.
The Defendant/Appellant unequivocally surrendered the premises
by abandonment of the premises in September 1991 (T. 88);
Defendant/Appellant's failure to pay rent in July 1992 (T. 32 - 34, 104);
notified Plaintiffs/Appellees in a letter dated October 8, 1992, of
Defendant/Appellant's intent to abandon the premises and terminate the
lease agreement (T. 90, 91; Defendant's Exhibit #21).
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones testified that after
Defendant/Appellant vacated the premises, Plaintiff/Appellee Norval
Jones placed twenty-six (26) head of cattle in the corrals and feed yards,
placed hay into the shed, placed his own personal farm equipment into
the commodity sheds, and used the farm machinery, including the grain
chopper, Ford tractor and manure box, and Knight spreader for his own
use and benefit (T. 38 -41, 97 -100).
Plaintiff/Appellee Norval Jones sold the tenant house to Randy and
Karen Jones (T. 100 -102; 145, 146).
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I he ovorwfIHIIIIIIK) vvoii|ltt nf (he evidence provides that Appellees
knew of Appellant's abandonment of the premises by September 1, 1991, but
fjfedB't) mil 1 11nix|,id* their damages.
Plaintiff/Appellee Nerval Jones acknowledged that he made 110 effoi f to
release the premises to anyone else, and that he didn't want to release
the premises to anyone else althougl 11 ie wns c *ot itnrt* »d ! iy tl nfH" I M
parties who were interested in leasing the premises immediately after
Defendant/Appellant: vacated HIP piPiiiises ij 1 in 1 li ir

n)Hj.

Appellees' alleged reasonable expectations that Appellant would
retun t In Ihp pi onuses WPIP finally iininasmiMble

Given that Appellees

did not intend and never did attempt to mitigate their damages, it was
ei i oi foi tl ie l:i ial cc >i n I: to award one (I) additional year of rental from July
1992 to July 1993.
POINT IV
APPELLANT MARSHALED ALL OF THE RELEVANT EVIDENC
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE.

^ «

Appellees take exception that Appellant failed to marshal all of his
evidence which Appellees attempt to demonstrate tlir o

if

their

own statement of facts. However, Appellees' statement of facts, in many
instances, is not supported by the recoid -inh heals with (a<.K nnl nelf-vniit or
material to the issues before this court, and, in some instances, is an inaccurate
i epi esentatio-

t.

$.
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Appellees' and Appellant's statement of facts do not contain numbered
paragraphs, but, nonetheless, Appellant will treat the paragraphs as though they
were numbered and respond to the paragraph numbers as follows:
Paragraph 2: This paragraph is not relevant as to the issues before this
court. However Appellant's statement of facts sets forth the adequate facts to
determine this is an agricultural lease of dairy facilities. (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of
Appellant's statement of facts).
Paragraph 3: This paragraph is not relevant as to the issues before this
court. However, Appellant's statement of facts sets forth adequate facts to
determine this is an agricultural lease of dairy facilities (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of
Appellant's statement of facts). The second sentence in paragraph 3 is not an
accurate statement and not part of the record.
Paragraph 4: The first sentence of paragraph 4 dealing with the lease is
adequately set forth in Appellant's recitation of facts (See paragraphs 1 - 5 of
Appellant's statement of facts). The remainder of this paragraph is not relevant
as to the issues before this court in that the contract for the sale of cows had
been completed (T. 27 - 31 )4. The trial court's Memorandum Decision, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment make no mention as to the
contract of sale of cows.

In June 1991, the transaction on the purchase of the cows was completed. Appellant
stopped paying rent in July 1992.
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Paragraphs 5 - 8 : These paragraphs are not relevant or material as to the
issues before this court. The trial court, in its Memorandum Decision, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, makes no mention of these
facts.
Paragraph 9: This paragraph does not accurately characterize the
testimony of the haylage. Appellant testified that the silage in 1991 was placed
on his property rather than on the leased premises (T. 24). It is a question of
whether it is relevant and material. The silage was removed about the same
time as the lease payments ceased (T. 32 - 34, 104). The first sentence is not
an accurate representation. The parties entered into a lease agreement on the
21st day of August, 1989 (T. 20 - 22, 248, 284). Appellant left the premises in
September 1991 (T. 88), and Appellee stopped receiving rent in July 1992
(T. 32 - 34, 104). In November 1991, the Appellees placed hay into the sheds
(T. 3 8 - 4 1 , 9 7 - 1 0 0 ) .
Paragraph 10: This paragraph is not relevant in that the contract of the
purchase of the cows had been completed and is not in issue with the lease
agreement (T. 27 - 31). The lease remained in effect when the contract for
purchase of the cows was completed prior to the events affecting the surrender
and termination of the lease or failure to mitigate damages after breach of the
lease (T. 27-31).
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Paragraph 11: This paragraph is not relevant in that the contract on the
purchase of the cows was completed (T. 27 -31). The lease and the relevant
terms and conditions therein had been set forth in Appellant's Brief (See
paragraphs 1 - 5 of Appellant's statement of facts).
Paragraph 12: This paragraph contains the facts in Appellant's Brief (See
paragraphs 1 - 5 of Appellant's statement of facts).
Paragraph 13: This paragraph contains the facts in Appellant's Brief (See
paragraphs 5 - 7 of Appellant's statement of facts). Appellees make a great deal
about haylage (very questionable to relevance that was on Appellant's premises.
This issue was not material as to the trial court's Memorandum Decision,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment). However, Appellant's
testimony states that the haylage was removed the same year that it was
delivered in 1991. Mr. Arambel testified:
Question: When was the haylage removed?
Answer: By myself. Yes.
Question: When was it removed?
Answer: Every year it was fed out and paid for as we went through the
season. (T. 279 - 280)
The Appellee did not receive payments beginning in July 1992, the
alleged breach of lease. For that reason, haylage was not even relevant.
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Paragraph 14: This paragraph is not an accurate representation of the
facts and is not supported by the record. The first sentence of paragraph 14 is
not relevant or material as to the issues before this court. The second sentence
of paragraph 14 is inaccurate in that the record did not state that Arambel
allowed Jones to use the corrals free of charge for the summer of 1990
(T. 36). The third sentence of paragraph 14 is immaterial as to the issues before
this court.
Paragraph 15: Appellant's statement of facts sets forth adequate similar
facts in Appellant's Brief (See paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appellant's statement of
facts). The first sentence of paragraph 15 is inaccurate in that the record did not
state: (1) there were three (3) opportunities to lease the property for short
periods of time, and (2) that Todd Davis just wanted to milk the cows on the
property until he sold them. The correct recitation of the record is as follows:
Question: Mr. Jones, when Mr. Arambel moved off the premises in June
of 1992, thereafter did you make any effort to re-lease the premises to
anybody else?
Answer: No.
Question: You made no effort whatsoever?
Answer: I had people contact me wanting to lease those premises. At
one time, an individual contacted me about leasing the premises and I
stated that Mr. Arambel and myself were in litigation and that I, it was my
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opinion and my understanding that he still held the lease and that I could,
I had no opportunity to let the use of the premises go to anyone else.
Question: Alright. Can you tell me how many people contacted you
about releasing the premises?
Answer: I can think of three.
Question: Can you name those individuals, those dates and times, that
contacted you?
Answer: I cannot name the dates and times. I can, the one individual, it
was shortly after Mike had moved to Hyrum so that he would move in
October or November. His name would have been Todd Davis. He
indicated that he was interested in leasing it and talked to Mike about
that, and, I informed him that as far as I understood Mike still should be
paying the lease and still should have the premises at his option. So, I
refused his offer. Or I refused - - He didn't make an offer. I just refused to
let him lease it.
The other individual was Goodyear, two brothers who were
neighbors approached me and wanted to lease it. They wanted to let
them come and operate the premises for a period of four or five or six
months until they could get things going, and they wanted to pay a certain
amount of money which they never indicated what it would be. I felt this
was acceptable (T. 107 -109).
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Paragraph 16: This paragraph contains the facts presented in Appellant's
Brief. Additionally, paragraph 16 is inaccurate and is not cited to the record "that
Jones never took any action to terminate the lease."
Paragraph 17: This paragraph contains the relevant facts in Appellant's
Brief (See paragraph 8 of Appellant's statement of facts). The last sentence in
paragraph 17 is inaccurate in that it states that "Arambel never repaired those
items or equipment." This is not supported by the record.
Paragraph 18: This paragraph contains relevant facts in Appellant's Brief
(See paragraphs 5 and 6 of Appellant's statement of facts).
Paragraph 19: This paragraph contains relevant facts in Appellant's Brief
(See paragraphs 1 4 - 1 6 of Appellant's statement of facts). However, paragraph
19 also contains facts that are not relevant to the issues before the court,
particularly failure to keep the improvements on the premises in good order, and
damage to the leased premises beyond normal wear. Appellant's record does
provide that the Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law contained a statement
that Appellee had a continuing expectation that Appellant would return to the
leased premises.
Appellant's Brief sets forth all the relevant and material facts as to the
issues before the court, i.e. the lease. Appellant's facts are not rebutted by
Appellees, and Appellant urges that Appellant's statement of facts provide an
adequate statement of all the issues before this court.

14

CONCLUSION
For those reasons above, Appellant has revealed all crucial and
incriminating evidence. Appellees provide no conflicting, relevant testimony as it
relates to this lease agreement. Given the nature of the facts, this court should
grant the relief as set forth in the original Brief of the Appellant.
DATED this

j/* day of September, 1996.

At

Gregory SKabelund
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

15

• )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of the REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANT in the United States mail, postage prepaid, to the following:
L. BRENT HOGGAN
Olson & Hoggan
88 West Center
PO Box 525
Logan, UT 84323-0525
DATED this / >

day of September, 1996.

16

